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NOTES
EFFEcT ON THE- A.F. OF L.-C.I.O. CONTROVERSY OF THE DETERMINATION OF
APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNITS UNDER THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT *
THE NATIONAL Labor Relations Act provides that the representatives se-
lected by a majority of the employees within an appropriate unit shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in that unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining.' Authority is vested in the National Labor Relations
Board to determine whether ". . . the unit appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or sub-
division thereof "12 but no standards are provided to direct that determination.
When, as in the great majority of cases before the Board, the scope of
the unit has not been put in -issue, the proposed unit has uniformly been sanc-
tioned. Before bestowing its approval, however, the Board has attempted to(
justify its position in terms of such flexible criteria as the eligibility require-
ments of a union claiming to represent the employees,3 customary groupings,'
homogeneity and mutual interests,6 departmental organization of the em-
ployer's business,6 and employee preference.7
Selection of the appropriate unit is not always mere routine, for disputes
over the scope of the unit have occasionally cropped up, and the C.I.O.-
A. F. of L. rift8 foreshadows an increased number of such controversies. In
the disputed cases the Board has talked in terms of the standards employed
in the non-controversial. cases, but other considerations seem to have been
determinative. Whenever the dispute has arisen between a legitimate union
*In re General Steel Castings Corp., R-196, 3 N L R B No. 78 (Oct. 4, 1937).
1. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 159a (Supp. 1936).
2. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 159b (Supp. 1936).
3. in re New England Transportation Co., I N L R B 130 (1936); In re Santa
Fe Trail Transportation Co., R-126, 165-D-132 (Apr. 2, 1937) ; It re Hunter Packing
Co., R-181, 3 N L R B No. 10 (July 23, 1937).
4. In re Harbor Boat Building Co., 1 N L R B 349 (1936); In re M. H. Birge
& Sons Co., 1 N L R B 731 (1936) ; In re Williams Dimond & Co., R-130, .177-D-137
(May 24, 1937).
5. In re United Press Associations, R-206, 3 N L R B No. 29 (Aug. 20, 1937)
(white collar unit). Community of interest may be inferred from similarity in standards
of pay and working conditions. Consequently production and maintenance workers
have been held appropriate units. In re United States Stamping Co., 1 N L R B 123
(1936) ; In re Stone Knitting Mills Co., R-200, 3 N L R B No. 22 (Aug. 7, 1937).
6. In re The Associated Press, 1 N L R B 686 (1936); In re Somerville Manu-
facturing Co., 1 N L RB 864 (1936) ; In re Atlas Mills Inc., C-107, 3 N L RB No. 3
(July 14, 1937).
7. In re Mercantile Marine Co., 1 N L R B 384 (1936) (request to be excluded) ;
In re American Tobacco Co., R-32, 112-D-99 (Sept. 1, 1936) (request of different
locals to be bracketed together). These criteria are discussed in Legis. (1937) 12 Wis.
L. Ray. 367. On the determination of bargaining units under the National Industriat
Recovery Act, see Comment (1935) 48 HAzy. L. Ray. 630, 634.
8. The background of the dispute is discussed in FORTuE, Oct. 1936, p. 89.
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and either an employer 9 or an employee association with the earmarks of a
company union, 10 the unit submitted by the bona fide group has been chosen.
In these decisions the Board has been guided by the prohibition against com-
pany unions expressed in the Act, 1 but no such policy declaration is available
when the controversy is between two bona fide labor unions, especially when
one disputant is affiliated with the A. F. of L. and the other with the C.I.O.,
for the act expresses no opinion as to the propriety of the various forms of
labor organization. In such circumstances the Board has been forced to pro-
ceed cautiously since any decision will be fraught with important consequence
for the C.I.O.-A.F. of L. dispute.
In an early case the Board applied the doctrine that where competing unions
are both affiliated with the same parent organization recourse must be had
to the parent,12 even though one of the supposed affiliates of the A. F. of L.
was a C.I.O. union.'3 But since the Board has subsequently taken notice
that the C.I.O. unions will no longer abide by the Federation rulings,1 4 the
Board has been forced to choose between craft and industrial units. At first,
the factor of traditional organization, which ordinarily must benefit the well
established A. F. of L. craft unions, held sway in the determination of units' s
Of course this factor may inure to the benefit of the C.LO. on those occasions
when the A. F. of L. attempts to uproot an entrenched C.I.O. union.1 0 Sev-
eral recent decisions' have given even greater aid to the Federation. In the
9. Where the union sought a unit smaller than the employer unit desired by the
employer, the Board has sanctioned the union's request. In re Delaw.-are-New Jersey
Ferry Co., 1 N LR B 85 (1935) ; In re R. C. A. Communications, Inc., R-152, 201-D-157
(June 30, 1937). The union's demands have likewise been granted where the positions
of union and employer were reversed and the former sought an employer unit. In re
Shell Oil Co. of California, R-123, 176-D-136 (May 24, 1937); In re Fleischer Studios,
R-160, 3 N L RB No. 18 (Aug. 3, 1937).
10. In re Atlantic Refining Co., 1 N L RB 359 (1936); In re Motor Transport
Co., R-113, 145-D-118a (Jan.'22, 1937); In re Portland Gas & Coke Co., R-115,
158-D-122a (-Mar. 9, 1937).
11. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. 1936). See also the statement of
J. Warren Madden, Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, N. Y. Times,
Oct. 16, 1937, p. 1, col. 1.
12. In re Aluminum Co. of America, 1 N L R B 530 (1936); In re Axton-Fisher
Tobacco Co., 1 N L R B 604 (1936); In re American Tobacco Co., R-r-, 123-D-99a
(Oct. 31, 1936). Cf. In re California State Brewers Inst. of al., 19 F. Supp. 824
(N. D. Cal. 1937).
13. In re Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 1 N LRB 614 (1936).
14. In. re Interlake Iron Corp., R-149, 195-D-151 (June 26, 1937). See (1937)
6 I. J. A. BULL- 41, 51.
15. See especially the importance of the factor of tradition in the water transporta-
tion decisions. In re International Mercantile Marine Co., 1 N LRB 334 (1936);
In re Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., R-36, 98-D-90 (July 8, 1936) ; In re Black Diamond
Steamship Corp., R-107, 117-D-103 (Sept. 24, 1936); it re Grace Line, Inc., R-110,
127-D-109 (Nov. 13, 1936).
16. In re Huth & James Shoe Manufacturing Co., R-174, 3 N L RB No. 20 (Aug.
3, 1937); In re Marcus Loew Booking Agency, R-184, 3 N L R B No. 33 (Aug. 25,
1937).
17. In re Globe Machine and Stamping Co., R-178, 3 N L RB No. 25 (Aug. 11,
1937); it re City Auto Stamping Co., R-203, 3 N LRB No. 24 (Aug. 11, 1937);
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typical situation, the A. F. of L. unions claim that a plant should be divided
into a series of craft units, while the C.I.O. union maintains that a plant unit
is proper. The Board indicates that the factors are evenly balanced between
craft and industrial units and that it will decline to settle the issue itself but
instead will leave it to the desire of the employees. In determining the prefer-
ence of the employees, however, the Board does not permit a majority of the
employees in the plant to determine the unit; rather it allows each of the units
proposed by the A. F. of L. to vote separately as to whether it will bargain
as an entity or merge into an industrial unit. Implicit in such a decision-one
which the A. F. of L. has sought to insert into the National Labor Relations
Act by amendment1 8-is a determination in favor of the craft form of or-
ganization, since each proposed craft unit is deemed appropriate unless it
votes to merge into a larger unit. On the other hand, a decision allowing a
majority of employees in the entire plant to choose the unit would favor the
C.I.O.
In these disputes the Board is in an unenviable position, for any decision
it renders must necessarily aid either of the rival organizations in its struggle
for superiority. Since the Board is doubtless aware of the implication of its
holdings, the recent decisions would seem to indicate a determination to
espouse the craft form of organization. Whether it has resolved to do so
because of a belief in the intrinsic merit of craft unionism or because of re-
peated criticism that it is an adjunct of the C.I.O. 19 is mere speculation. By
making its choice in an easy, non-committal manner, the opposition of the
C.I.O. to an arbitrary choice of craft units has been avoided,20 and the Board
may await a settlement of grievances by the rival organizations or a statutory
solution of the problem.' The latter possibility seems remote, however, for
Congress is probably as reluctant as the Board to take sides in this dispute.
JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF THE TERMINATION OF AN EMERGENCY *
IT is an historic maxim of constitutional law that an emergency cannot
create power.' While this principle was used to dispose of the National
In re Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, R-151, 3 N L R B No. 69 (Sept. 14, 1937);
In re General Steel Castings Corp., R-196, 3 N L R B No. 78 (Oct. 4, 1937). But
cf. In re Ohio Foundry Co., R-193, 3 N L RB No. 71 (Sept. 21, 1937) (decision
favoring C. I. 0., but both organizations apparently organized along craft lines).
18. At the behest of the A. F. of L., Senator Walsh introduced a bill providing
that " . . . in any case where a majority of the employees of a particular craft shall
so decide, the board shall designate such craft as a unit appropriate for the purpose
of collective bargaining." N. Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1937, p. 14, col. 4.
19. See, e.g., N. Y. Times, July 23, 1937, p. 1, col. 4 (statement by Senator Nye);
N. Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1937, p. 2, col. 3 (A. F. of L. resolution demanding a purge of
the National Labor Relations Board).
20. These decisions, however, have already been criticized by the C. I. 0. See
N. Y. Tines, Oct. 14, 1937, p. 4, col. 2.
*Lawyers' Trust Co. v. Kingsway Realty and Mortgage Corp., 162 N. Y. Misc. 13,
293 N. Y. Supp. 633 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
1. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 121 (U. S. 1866).
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Industrial Recovery Act,2 a qualification, originated by Chief Justice White
- that an emergency "affords a reason for the exertion of a living power
already enjoyed" 3 - has supplied a basis for sustaining such temporary
measures as the pre-war Railway Labor Act 4 and the emergency rent,6 mort-
gage moratorium6 and milk control7 laws. But even when recognized, this
power is rigorously confined in its application. The legislative declaration
that an emergency exists is entitled to great weight, but is not conclusive 8
The law must be limited by reasonable conditions appropriate to the emer-
gency ;9 it must be of temporary duration ;10 and it must become immediately
inoperative upon termination of the critical period, a question of fact always
open to examination by the courts." While this reserved judicial power has
never yet been exercised,'12 continued renewals of the mortgage relief laws,
originally sustained as emergency measures, have prompted mortgagees to
raise the objection that steady improvement in economic conditions has ter-
2. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 528 (1935).
3. Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 348 (1917) ; Home Building and Loan Association
v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 426 (1934).
4. Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 348 (1917).
5. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135 (1921); Marcus Brown Co. v. Feldman, 256
U. S. 170 (1921).
6. Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934); Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co. v. Morris, 181 La. 277, 159 So. 388 (1935); Des Moines
Joint Stock Land Bank v. Nordholm, 217 Ia. 1319, 253 X. W. 701 (1934); Russell v.
Battle Creek Lumber Co., 265 Mich. 649, 252 N. W. 561 (1934). Contra: Travellers
Insurance Co. v. Marshall, 124 Tem. 45, 76 S. V. (2d) 1007 (1934).
1 7. Albert v. Milk Control Board, 200 N. E. 688 (Ind. 1936) ; State ex rel. State
Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 118 N. J. Eq. 504, 179 A. 116 (1935).
The constitutionality of milk control statutes does not necessarily depend upon the
recognition of the emergency power. The industry has been held to be affected with
a public interest and may be regulated under the state police power. Nebbia V. New
York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
8. Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543 (1924); Wilson v. Colvard, 172
Miss. 804, 161 So. 123 (1935). In those states which provide for a referendum if
petitioned by 6% of the registered voters before a legislative enactment becomes valid,
an exception is usually made for "emergency" laws. In such cases the legislative
declaration that an emergency exists has been held conclusive. State ex rel. Schorr v.
Kennedy, 9 N. E. (2d) 278 (Ohio 1937).
9. The conditions were found to be reasonable in Home Building and Loan Asso-
ciation v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934), and unreasonable in Vorthen Co. v. Thomas,
292 U. S. 426 (1934).
10. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U. S. 426 (1934).
11. Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 442 (1934);
Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543 (1924); Mutual Building and Loan Asso-
ciation v. Moore, 232 Ala. 488, 494, 169 So. 1, 7 (1936).
12. The nearest the courts have come to declaring an emergency terminated was
in Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543 (1924), where the case was returned to
the lower court for a finding of fact as to whether the emergency was at an end.
Before any finding was made, however, the issue became moot. For a suggestion by the
court that it would declare the emergency over, if the issue were properly presented,
see Mutual Building and Loan Association v. Moore, 232 Ala. 483, 494, 169 So. 1, 7
(1936).
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minated the emergency and invalidated further application of the statutes.13
Since mortgage relief laws usually specify a fixed date at which the statute
is to expire,14 a court met with the above contention must decide whether it
can declare the emergency at an end in advance of the day set by the legis-
lature. At least two state tribunals, feeling that the law-making body has
a closer view of the economic scene, have been unwilling to look behind the
legislative finding that the crisis will continue to a fixed future date.'3 But
unless the legislature is to be permitted to lift itself by its own bootstraps,
the date prescribed by the statute should not preclude judicial examination.
If, without regard to legislative fiat, a court decides to determine whether
or not the emergency has ended, it may base its conclusion either upon judi-
cial notice or upon evidence and findings. While judicial notice has been
taken of obvious widespread depression in order to sustain emergency mea-
sures,'0 it would be far more difficult for a court to have judicial knowledge
of the debatable conclusion that the economic crisis has passed. The sufficiency
of judicial notice in this situation has been intimated, but never declared.'1
Since the determinative facts should be fully found prior to an expression
of opinion upon an important constitutional question,18 and since the legis-
lative finding of an emergency is entitled to great weight, reliance upon judi-
cial notice would appear inadequate. If, on the other hand, the question is
submitted to a referee for evidence and findings, as was done in a recent
New York case,' 9 formidable objections are again presented. A court would
probably be reluctant to permit the plaintiff to foreclose upon the referee's
finding that the emergency had ceased in but a single locality, since the legis-
lature has declared a moratorium throughout the jurisdiction, and rests its
power upon a widespread emergency.20 Yet the accumulation and analysis
13. See Mutual Building and Loan Association v. Moore, 232 Ala. 488, 169 So. 1
(1936); National Bank of Aitkin v. Showell, 195 Minn. 273, 262 N. W. 689 (1935);
Lawyer's Trust Co. v. Kingsway Realty and Mortgage Corp., 162 Misc. 13, 293 N. Y.
Supp. 633 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
14. A time limit has been held a prerequisite to the validity of emergency legisla-
tion. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U. S. 426 (1934); Birmingham Trust and Savings
Co. v. Joseph, 175 So. 275 (Ala. 1937) ; Vanderbilt v. Brunton Piano Co., 111 N. 3.
Law 596, 169 A. 177 (1933). Contra: In re People ex rel. Van Schaick, 264 'N. Y. 69,
190 N. E. 153 (1934).
15. National Bank of Aitkin v. Showell, 195 Minn. 273, 262 N. W. 689 (1935);
Albert v. Milk Control Board, 200 N. E. 688 (Ind. 1936).
16. Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 444 (1934).
17. See Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543, 548 (1924); Mutual Building
and Loan Association v. Moore, 232 Ala. 488, 494, 169 So. 1, 7 (1936). But see Borden's
Farm Products v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 210 (1934).
18. Borden's Farm Products Co., Inc. v. Baldwin, 293 U. S. 194, 210 (1934).
19. Lawyer's Trust Co. v. Kingsway Realty and Mortgage Corp., 162 Misc. 13,
293 N. Y. Supp. 633 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
20. In upholding the new Frazier-Lemke Act, however, the Supreme Court sus-
tained a provision permitting a judge to refuse the benefits of the statute to a mortgagor
if he should find that the emergency had ceased in a particular locality. Wright v.
Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, Va., 57 Sup. Ct. 556, 562 (1937).
But there is no similar provision in any of the state mortgage relief acts, and it would
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by a single referee of data based upon state-wide real estate sales and fore-
closures and available economic surveys would take many months. The delay
might well approximate the fixed moratorium period which the mortgagee
is seeking to avoid by resort to judicial proceedings. Moreover, the assembled
information would be susceptible of many conclusions. The future state of
any market must be a matter of conjecture. If any improvement were noted,
a referee would have to indulge in crystal-gazing to determine whether it
denoted a steady recovery or only a temporary spurt. Even if an exact
analysis were possible, there are no standards for determining what degree
of recovery terminates an emergency. Furthermore, since most of the mort-
gages affected have already matured, any abrupt ending of the moratorium
by the courts would present a problem of refinancing itself constituting a
new emergency that would require legislative measures postponing payment
during the period of readjustment. 2' Forestalled creditors may consequently
discover that their right to challenge the continued existence of the emergency
has little substance.
A court inquiring into the extended existence of the critical period might
well come to the conclusion that the emergency has not yet terminated. While
mortgage moratoria can not be prolonged indefinitely, emergency deficiency
judgment acts, such as that renewed until 1938 in New York,- may soon
be adopted as permanent measures for the protection of mortgagors. A less
drastic statute enacted for this purpose in North Carolina has recently been
upheld by the United States Supreme Court on the ground that the law
impaired only the mortgagee's remedy, and did not seriously affect his right.cu
And although a permanent depression of all real estate values is difficult to
envisage, the situation in such regions as the "dust bowl" may become chronic
and require lasting moratory legislation. Rather than stretch the basic consti-
tutional power to the anomalous point of a quasi-permanent emergency, and
rather than seek refuge in the dubious distinction between right and remedy,
a more solid foundation should be sought upon which to rest these statutes,
both in their present form and as modified for continuous operation. Since
the police power may, under the emergency theory, be dilated to meet an evil
which exists temporarily, there seems to be no reason for denying the power
to deal with the evil when it has become permanent. A trend in this direction
is noticeable in the history of the milk control laws, which were originally
be difficult for a judge, without legislative sanction, to upset a state-wide law in a
single locality.
21. See N. Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1937, § 13, p. 1, col. 1.
22. Sec. 1083a of the New York Civil Practice Act, extended to July 1, 1933 by
Chapter 83 of the Session Laws of 1937. New York has both a mortgage moratorium
(Sec. 1077a of the Civil Practice Act, which may soon be ex-tended until 1941; N. Y.
Times, Sept. 26, 1937, § 13, p. 1, col. 1) and a deficiency judgment provision prohibiting
a deficiency judgment which does not deduct the "fair market value" of the property.
For a discussion of the constitutionality of the latter, see (1935) 3 U. o Prrrs. L
REv. 54.
23. Richmond Mortgage and Loan Corp. v. WVachovia Bank and Trust Co., 210
N. C. 29, 185 S. E. 482 (1936), aft'd, 57 Sup. Ct. 338 (1937).
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devised to meet an emergency and upheld on that ground, but which are
now held constitutional upon much broader grounds. 24
CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY OF LIFE INSURANCE POLICY
AS A FR UDULENT CONVEYANCE *
A EAr. estate operator in deepening financial difficulties made his wife
beneficiary of three policies of life insurance totalling $50,000 which had
been payable to his estate and were listed as assets on financial statements
he gave a bank, his principal creditor. Soon after, he refused the bank's
request to assign the policies to it, but did not reveal the previous transfer.
Two months later he committed suicide. In the bank's action to have its
$15,000 claim paid out of the proceeds of the policy, the lower court found
that the insured had not been insolvent when he changed the beneficiary and
that no fraud was intended. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed this
decision but held that these findings were unnecessary, because a change of
beneficiary of a life policy was not such a transfer of property as could be
a fraudulent conveyance, except as to the cash surrender value of the policy,
which in this case had been almost entirely hypothecated to the insurer.1
The decision represents the fruit of a long judicial struggle in which hu-
mane considerations have been increasingly mitigating the severities of a'
creditor economy, a trend also evidenced by statutes exempting the proceeds
of life insurance policies to a limited amount from estate taxation 2 and
homesteads from the claims of creditors.3 Where the problem has involved
the payment of premiums by an insolvent insured, legislatures and courts
have long successtully complemented each other's efforts in allowing the in-
solvent to make reasonable provision for his family.4 But where, as in the
principal case, the creditor protests that he was relying on a policy originally
payable to the insured's estate, protection of dependents has been more diffi-
cult. A half century ago the problem was an easy one, for the maxim placing
24. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934); Albert v. Milk Control Board,
200 N. E. 688 (Ind. 1936) ; State ex rel. State Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk
Co., 118 N. J. Eq. 504, 179 A. 116 (1935); Rohrer v. Milk Control Board, 186 A, 336
(Pa. 1937).
• First Wisconsin National Bank of Milwaukee v. Roehling, 269 N. W. 677 (Wis.
1936), rehearing denied and opinion corrected, 272 N. W. 664 (Wis. 1937).
1. Ibid.
2. 44 STAT. 71 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. § 411 (g) (1934); cf. In re Elting's Estate,
78 Misc. 692, 140 N. Y. Supp. 238 (Surr. Ct. 1912).
3. ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 52, § 9; Wis. STAT. (1935) § 272.20;
see Comment (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1023.
4. See GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (1931) 237-43; VANCE, INSURANCE (2d
ed. 1930) 621-26. This development has taken place in the face of strenuous scholarly
opposition. See Williston, Can an Insolvent Debtor Insure His Life for the Benefit
of His Wife? (1891) 25 Amma. LAw REv. 185; Comments (1923) 23 CoL. L. REV. 771,
(1913) 26 H~Av. L. REv. 362.
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"justice" before "generosity" was relentlessly invoked. An assignment or
change of beneficiary5 depriving the insured's creditor of an asset, presently
if not immediately forthcoming, was a fraudulent conveyance without more
ado.6 But the courts gradually became dissatisfied with this result and sought
to protect the insured's dependents.7 Many tried stretching the protective
statutes to apply to transferred as well as original and continued policies,8
while others finally evolved, from occasional hint and back-handed reference,
an apparently foolproof method of protecting the transfer. In the face of
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, which had extended the applica-
bility of the general rule of the Statute of Elizabeth ° to any property "liable
for any debts of the debtor,""L the change of beneficiary was said to be not
a transfer of "property," hence not possibly a fraudulent conveyance.'-
5. Since the provision allowing a change of beneficiary is a comparatively recent
development in life insurance policies, the early cases deal almost exclusively with as-
signments. The two are often distinguished, because a change of beneficiary may be
accomplished only in the manner provided for, while an assignment may be effected in
a number of ways. See Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Swett, 222 Fed. 200, 205 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1915) ; Opitz v. Karel, 118 Wis. 527, 532, 95 N. W. 948, 950 (1903). Since the
assignor may, and often does, undertake to continue payment of premiums, there is
nothing to be gained here by distinguishing the cases involving the different methods
of transfer.
6. Aetna National Bank v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 24 Fed. 769 (C. C. S. D.
N. Y. 1885); Friedman v. Fennell, 94 Ala. 570, 10 So. 649 (1892); Stokes & Son v.
Coffey, 8 Bush 533 (Ky. 1872) ; Catchings v. Manlove, 39 Miss. 655 (1851) ; Reynolds
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 160 N. Y. 635, 55 N. E. 305 (1899); Burton v. Farinholt, 85
N. C. 260 (1882) ; Appeal of Elliott's Executors, 50 Pa. 75 (1865).
7. Early cases unfavorable to creditors are scarce. Cole v. Marple, 93 Ill. 58
(1881) (creditors entitled only to premiums paid while insolvent); Johnson v. Alex-
ander, 125 Ind. 575, 25 N. E. 706 (1890) (assignment was to certain creditors) ; Suc-
cession of Hearing, 26 La. Ann. 326 (1874). Of the cases decided since 1920, nearly
twice as many were favorable to the family as to creditors.
8. Morehead's Adm'r v. Mfayfield, 100 Ky. 51, 58 S. AV. 473 (1900); Judson v.
Walker, 155 Mo. 166, 55 S. W. 1083 (1900) ; Lytle v. Baldinger, 84 Ohio St. 1, 95 N. E.
389 (1911); Borg v. McCroskery, 120 N. J. Eq. 80, 184 Atl. 187 (Ch. 1936); Hechtkopf
v. Mendlowitz, 156 Misc. 635, 282 N. Y. Supp. 338 (N. Y. City Ct. 1935); Teague v.
Pilot Life Ins. Co., 200 N. C. 450, 157 S. E. 421 (1931). Some courts have refused so
to extend like statutes. Bailey v. Wood, 202 Mass. 562, 89 N. . 149 (1909) ; Stoudt v.
Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 150 Misc. 675, 271 N. Y. Supp. 409 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
9. Life policies were said to have a definite, pecuniary value upon the approaching
death of the insured, implying that this might not be true if the insured had a normal
life expectancy. Cf. Barbour v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co., 61 Conn. 240, 247-8,
23 Atl. 154, 155 (1891); Navassa Guano Co. v. Cockfield, 253 Fed. 883, 835-6 (C. C. A
4th, 1918); LaBorde v. Farmers' State Bank of Millard, 116 Neb. 33, 44, 215 N. IV.
559, 564 (1927).
10. At common law a voluntary conveyance by an insolvent debtor was conclusively
presumed to be in fraud of creditors, but only as to "lands and tenements, goods and
chattels," i.e., tangible property. 13 Etaz. c. 5 (1571).
11. Wis. STAT. (1935) § 242.01 (1).
12. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of United States v. Hitchcock, 270 Mich. 72, 258
N. W. 214 (1935), (1935) 33 MIic. L. REv. 1103; cf. Coalter v. Willard, 156 Va. 79,
158 S. E. 724 (1931); Mahood v. Maynard, 114 NV. Va. 385, 171 S. E. 884 (1933),
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In the principal case, this conclusion was reached in spite of a statute which
protects the proceeds of life insurance from creditors "except in cases of
transfer with intent to defraud creditors . . .,"13 the court refusing to admit
that the exception contemplated the possibility that a change of beneficiary
might be fraudulent. Chiefly on the authority of a recent Michigan case,14
such a change was held not to be within the broad statutory definition of
conveyance: "every transfer . . . of tangible or intangible property . .. ..
But there is ample case authority conferring on insurance policies .many of
the attributes of property. Thus a policy represents an interest which will be
protected if the insurer commits anticipatory breach;i0 it is transferable;17
and it may constitute the res of a trust.'8 Although the policy had these attri-
butes, and although it may be classified as. property for some purposes, it
does not follow that this classification is necessary for the purposes of the
instant case. The property concept is sufficiently flexible to permit a great
amount of purposive manipulation. This the court realized, for it held that
"in a limited sense" the policy was property, but that it was not property for
the purpose of the fraudulent conveyance rule. The malleability of the con-
cept thus made it possible for the court to protect the insured's dependents
and yet at the same time satisfy the "justice" of a creditor economy.'0 To
reach the same result the court might conceivably have relied upon an anal-
ogy to the old doctrine that a power appendant in a debtor may be exercised
to destroy his estate and defeat the rights of his creditors therein,2 0 although
this doctrine has often been repudiated in the United States.2 ' The creditor
bank might then be held to a constructive knowledge that it was relying on
an interest subject to divestment by the exercise of the power to change the
beneficiary.
(1934) 40 W. VA. L. Q. 383 (Virginia and West Virginia have not adopted the Uni-
form Act). Some courts have specifically repudiated this conclusion. Gould v. Fleit-
mann, 188 "App. Div. 759, 176 N. Y. Supp. 631 (1st Dep't 1919); Walter v. Hartman,
67 S. W. 476 (Tenn. 1902).
13. Wis. STAT. (1935) § 272.18 (19).
14. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of United States v. Hitchcock, 270 Mich. 72, 258
N. W. 214 (1935).
15. Wis. STAT. (1935) § 242.01 (2). The Wisconsin rule, unique among the states,
maintaining that the right of the beneficiary of an old line life insurance policy is not
vested, is of no consequence with respect to a policy allowing change of beneficiary as
in the principal case. See VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 542-43, 563.
16. Merrick v. Northwestern National Life Ins. Co., 124 Wis. 221, 102 N. W. 593
(1905); see VANCE, INsuRANcE (2d ed. 1930) 327-?9.
17. This characteristic is set up as the fundamental test of an asset which is within
the creditor's reach. See GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (1931) 190.
18. Lashley v. Lashley, 212 Ala. 255, 102 So. 229 (1924) ; Hirsh v. Auer, 146 N. Y.
16, 40 N.E. 397 (1895) ; Johnston v. Scott, 76 Misc. 641, 137 N. Y. Supp. 243 (Sup. Ct.
1912); see 1 BOGERT, TRusTs AND TRusTEES (1935) 359, 412; 2 id. at 764.
19. "It is incorrect to say that the judiciary protected property; rather they called
that property to which they accorded protection." Hamilton and Till, Property, 12
ECarC. OF Soc. ScmcZs (1934) 528, 536.
20. See 1 SImEs, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) § 256.
21. Browning v. Bluegrass Hardware Co., 153 Va. 20, 149 S. E. 497 (1929) ; but cf.
Leggett v. Doremus, 25 N. J. Eq. 122 (Ch. 1874).
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More logical is the argument suggested by the Wisconsin court that since
only the cash surrender value of the policy was available to creditors at the
time of the change, they can claim no more thereafter.- The validity of this
reasoning eventually depends on the premise, that beyond the surrender value
the policy represents no property "liable for any debts of the debtor." But it
is nowhere declared that a contingent right does not come within this provi-
sion of the Uniform Act.23 Furthermore, no reason appears why the creditor
could not have subjected the proceeds of the policy to eventual liability for
his claim, either before the change of beneficiary by an equitable proceeding
to declare his interest in the policy, allowing him to pay the premiums in order
to safeguard that interest,-4 or after the insured's death by an action impress-
ing the proceeds with a constructive trust.2 Under the latter doctrine the
original res and its fruits can be followed and reached in any form if properly
identifiable, regardless of how small a value it may have had immediately
after the transfer when the trust was erected.2
But from a broader point of view the result reached in the principal case
may be desirable. The social function performed by securing the proceeds to
presumably otherwise destitute dependents is of at least equal importance to
that served by using them to meet creditors' demands. Further, one who ex-
tends credit in reliance on the security of life policies payable to the borrow-
er's estate but with the reserved power to change the beneficiary may pro-
tect himself by requiring an assignment and delivery of the policies. And
if he is a commercial lender, he is no doubt in a better position to spread the
22. This argument seems to have appeared originally in Davis v. Cramer, 133 Ark.
224, 202 S. W. 239 (1918).
23. "Contracts for the future payment of money depending upon conditions to be
performed are not, for any reason growing out of their uncertain character, exempt
from the claims of creditors." Stokes v. Amerman, 121 N. Y. 337, 343, 24 N. E. 819,
821 (1890). The assignment of future earnings has been commonly held void as to
creditors. Gragg v. Martin, 12 Allen 498 (Mass. 1866); Costello v. Great Falls Iron
Works, 59 Mont. 417, 196 Pac. 982 (1921) ; Lennon ir. Parker, 22 R. I. 43, 46 AtL 44
(1900).
24. Stokes v. Amerman, 121 N. Y. 337, 24 N. E. 819 (1890); cf. Spiro State Bank
v. Bankers' National Life Ins. Co., 69 F. (2d) 185, 188 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934) (possi-
bility of creditor's taking over unmatured life insurance and paying premiums suggest-
ed). The scarcity of cases directly supporting the availability to the creditor of anything
more than the surrender value may reasonably be explained by the desire of creditors
to liquidate claims as quickly as possible and their consequent unwillingness to await
the complete maturity of an insurance policy.
25. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union National Bank of Pittsburgh, 313 Pa. 467, 169 At.
209 (1933) ; see Lehman v. Gunn, 124 Ala. 213, 221, 27 So. 475, 477 (1900) ; Cornwel
v. Surety Fund Life Co., 44 S. D. 391, 402, 184 N. IV. 211, 214 (1921). In this field
the doctrine has been more often applied in cases where embezzled or misappropriated
funds were used to pay premiums. See Comment, (1925) 35 YeA.n L. J. 220.
26. Hill v. Flemming, 128 Ky. 201, 107 S. V. 764 (1908) ; see 4 BoGEnr, TnusTs A D
TRUSTEES (1935) 2657. There should be no difficulty as to identifying the funds, the
wife's insurable interest not being such property as to cause confusion as to the source
of the proceeds. Holmes v. Gilman, 138 N. Y. 369, 34 N. E. 205 (1893).
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risk and distribute the loss than are the insured's dependents.27 But in the
petition for a rehearing it was argued that undesirable consequences would
follow from the court's opinion since its inevitable effect would be a serious
curtailment of the usefulness of life insurance policies as a basis for the exten-
sion of credit.28 Although this proposition lacks cogency since it overlooks the
availability to the creditor of the pledge device, the court might have avoided
the argument by relying entirely on the state statute protecting the proceeds
of a policy made payable or assigned to a married woman,29 thus leaving
creditors the possibility of recovery upon proof of actual intent to defraud.
This statute was probably passed to aid the insured in effecting protection
of his wife and children after his death,3 0 and hence would not be put to an
unintended use.31 The court would have had ample precedent in thus frankly
declaring that this effort of the insured is as worthy of sanction as an attempt
to satisfy his creditors.32
APPLICABILITY OF A STATE' STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO THE CLAIM OF
A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN*
IN 1916, the Imperial Russian government deposited $5,000,000 with the
Guaranty Trust Company of New York. In 1917, the Soviet government,
upon displacing the Kerensky government, issued decrees of confiscation
pursuant to which about $9,000,000 held by Russian banks to the credit
of the Guaranty Trust Company was seized. The United States subse-
quently refused to recognize the Soviet government but continued to deal
with the representatives of the Kerensky government. Thereafter, the Guar-
anty Trust Company unequivocally repudiated its liability by charging
against the Russian account the sums due the bank that were confiscated
by the Soviet decree and sending notice thereof to the representatives of
27. For the argument in favor of such a consideration as a basis for legal decision,
see Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (1929) 38 YALE L. 3.
584, 720.
28. See brief filed by The First National Bank of Madison, Wis., and the First
National Bank of Oshkosh as amid curiae in support of the motion for rehearing in
the principal case, at 3-7, 15.
29. Wis. STAT. (1935) § 246.09.
30. See VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 546.
31. For a similar application of like statutes see cases cited in note 8, supra.
32. In Central Bank of Washington v. Hume, 128 U. S. 195 (1888), the United
States Supreme Court laid down the startling doctrine that an insolvent may apply a
moderate part of his income to the procuring and maintaining of life insurance for
his family's benefit, even in the absence of a statute. Apparently no case involving this
problem 'has reached the Wisconsin Supreme Court, hence the doctrine has never been
adopted there.
*United States v. Guaranty Trust Company of New York, N. Y. L. J., Sept. 3,
1937, p. 565, col. 1 (C. C. A. 2d).
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the Kerensky government.' Under the Roosevelt-Litvinoff agreements of
1933, recognizing the Soviet government, Russia assigned its claim to the
United States, which brought suit in a federal district court.2 The complaint
was dismissed on the ground that the action was barred by the New York
Statute of Limitations.3 On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed, holding the state Statute of Limitations inapplicable
to the claim of a foreign sovereign because of deference to sovereign rights
and principles of international comity.4
The issue of the principle case is one which has never before been squarely
decided.5 In reaching its decision, the court relied heavily upon the fact
that the United States, when suing in its governmental capacity, has been
held immune from the limitations statutes of the forty-eight states.0 In
private litigation, Statutes of Limitations have been regarded as essential
to judicial security, for loss of testimony, death of important witnesses and
destruction of evidence require prompt administration of justice.7 Why these
important policy considerations behind the Statute of Limitations should not
1. Appellant asserted that since the recognition of the Soviet government was
retroactive in its operation [see U. S. v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324 (1937)1, the Soviet
government became the owner of the bank deposit in issue in 1917 when it assumed
control of the Russian state, and consequertly that notice of repudiation to the Kerensky
government was not binding on the Soviet government. Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 11.
An answer to this question was rendered unnecessary in the principal case, since the
decision that the statute of limitations was inapplicable to the claim of a foreign sovereign
was predicated upon the assumed validity of the repudiation.
2. Since the opinion of the court proceeds on the assumption that the United
States was necessarily limited in all respects to the rights previously possessed by the
Russian government as its assignor, the case is discussed as though the Russian govern-
ment were the plaintiff.
3. Transcript of Record on Appeal, United States v. Guaranty Trust Company
of New York, p. 442.
4. United States v. Guaranty Trust Company of New York, N. Y. L. J., Sept. 3,
1937, p. 565, col. 1 (CC. C.A.2d).
5. See French Republic v. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co., 191 U. S. 427, 437 (1903),
where the court refused to decide whether a Statute of Limitations would apply to a
foreign sovereign, in view of the fact that the French government was merely a
nominal plaintiff suing in behalf of its lessee. Cf. Western Lunatic Asylum v. Miller,
29 IV. Va. 326, 1 S. E. 740 (1887) (Statute of Limitations of one state of the union
held to bar a suit brought by another state). For dicta in favor of applying a state
Statute of Limitations to a foreign sovereign, see Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. v. State
of Russia, 21 F. (2d) 396, 400 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927); United States v. Brown, 247 X. Y.
211, 218, 160 N. E. 13, 16 (1928). But see Bowers v. New York and Albany Lighterage
Co., 273 U. S. 346, 350 (1927); United States v. Hartpootlian, 24 F. (2d) 646, 648
(C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
6. Gibson v. Choteau, 13 Wall. 92 (1871); Davis v. Corona Coal Co., 265 U. S.
219 (1924). Where the United States is suing in a private capacity, however, a state
Statute of Limitations may be invoked against it. United States v. Beebe, 127 U. S.
338 (1888) (suit in behalf of private individuals); Denver and R. G. R. Co. v. United
States, 241 F. 614 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917) (suit as a property owner).
7. See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135, 139 (1879); United States v. Oregon
Lumber Co., 260 U. S. 290, 299 (1922) ; 1 WooD ox LrnrxTrzovs (4th ed. 1916) § 4.
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justify its invocation against a sovereign can be explained historically better
than rationally. The doctrine nullum tempus occurit regi grew up in the
common law as one of the royal prerogatives, based upon the notion that
the king was always busied for the public good and did not have the leisure
to assert his rights within the time limited.8 This same tenderness for the
sovereign's dignity or his pocketbook has firmly established the English
rule in the United States, supported by the public policy argument that the
interests of the public should not suffer because of the negligence of govern-
ment agents. 9 This rationale seems highly unrealistic in view of the com-
petent legal department maintained by the United States government which
places it in a better position to assert its rights within the time limited than
an ordinary citizen. Foreign governments are probably even better equipped
by virtue of their diplomatic as well as legal staffs and the relatively smaller
number of claims to handle. Furthermore, sovereign freedom from Statutes
of Limitations may result in positive detriment to the public since it may
tend to promote laxity on the part of government officials in pursuing claims.
Because this rule in favor of the sovereign is patently arbitrary,'0 a number
of state governments have rejected it either by judicial decision" or by
statute.' 2  Moreover, the considerations of local public interests prompting
the retention of the rule in favor of the United States and state govern-
ments have no bearing on the claims of a foreign sovereign.
Nor do principles of international comity afford any basis for granting
immunity to a foreign government voluntarily suing in our courts. Although
it would be an obvious encroachment on sovereign rights to compel a foreign
state to submit to the jurisdiction of another sovereign's courts"' and a
8. 1 BL. CoDm. *247.
9. See United States v. Thompson, 98 U. S. 486, 489 (1878); BuswEuL, THE
STATUTE OF LI.ITATIONS AND ADVERSE POSSESSION (1889) 148; cf. United States v. Lee,
106 U. S. 196, 206 et seq. (1882). When counties or municipalities seek immunity from
their state Statutes of Limitations, the problem becomes even more metaphysical for such
bodies merely derive authority from the ultimate sovereign, That limitations do operate
against political subdivisions, see Metropolitan R. R. v. District of Columbia, 132 U. S. 1
(1889); Bryant v. Cedar Co., 122 Neb. 853, 241 N. W. 538 (1932). Contra: Board of
Comm'rs of Douglas County v. City of Lawrence, 102 Kan. 656, 171 P. 610 (1918);
Herndon v. Board of Comm'rs in and for Pontotoc County, 158 Okla. 14, 11 P. (2d)
939 (1932).
10. The theory of sovereign immunity has been accepted by the courts as "an
existing fact to be recognized rather than explained." WATKINS, THE STATE AS A
PARTY LITIGANT (1927) 197. It could be just as persuasively argued, were it not for
sovereignty concepts, that the Statute of Limitations ought not run against a large
corporation because the stockholders should not suffer for the negligence of the directors.
11. Gathright v. State, 129 Ark. 339, 195 S. W. 1069 (1917).
12. The very state whose limitations law is involved in the principal case has
rejected the majority rule and has made the statute operative against itself. NEw YoRmI
C. P. A. § 54. Other states which have adopted statutes to the same effect are Georgia,
Idaho, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. Contra: Arizona, Florida,
Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Oregon, Tennessee, and Washington.
13. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812) ; The Parlement BeIge,
5 P. D. 197 (1880); WATxINs, op. cit. supra note 10, at 174.
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breach of international comity to refuse a friendly state file privilege of
suing in the tribunals of another country,14 nevertheless, when a foreign
government voluntarily plays the role of a litigant, it must comply with
the ordinary rules of the forum it has chosen."5 And one of the rules which
has consistently been regarded as part of the law of the forum is the Statute
of Limitations.' The court might have decided, on the unique facts of the
principal case, that the running of the Statute of Limitations against the
Soviet government was tolled until its disability to sue was removed by
recognition in 1933.Y7 But there appears to be little basis for the court's
broad proposition that refusal to grant a foreign country immunity from
state Statutes of Limitations accorded to the United States itself contravenes
principles of international comity. More precisely, the relevant question is
whether the United States, when suing in a foreign country, would be
exempt from its Statute of Limitations. It is at least doubtful whether such
an exemption would be granted. Clearly, application of the New York
Statute of Limitations to the Russian claim would not encroach upon the
national government's exclusive control over international relations. The
recognition of the Russian government and the attendant executive agree-
ments assigning the Russian claims to the United States would not be dis-
turbed by according a foreign government, or its assignee, equal treatment
with other litigants before our courts in determining the validity of those
claims. The rule in the instant case extends sovereign immunities into a
field where they serve no useful purpose but defeat an underlying policy of
another sovereign government.
14. The Sapphire, 11 Vall. 164 (1870); see Russian Socialist Federated Soviet
Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 255, 257, 139 N. E. 259, 260 (1923); 26 Au. J.
INr. L., SuPP., 493, 503.
15. United States v. National City Bank of New York, 83 F. (2d) 236 (C. C.A.
2d, 1936) (sovereign must submit to counterclaim); Republic of Honduras v. Soto,
112 N. Y. 310, 19 N. E. 845 (1889) (security for costs); King of Spain v. Hullet
and Widder, 1 Cl. & Fin. 333 (Ch. 1883) (sovereign must sign and verify answer to
cross-bill); Rothschild v. Queen of Portugal, 3 Y. & C. 594 (Ex. 1839) (bill of
discovery). See 26 Am. J. INT. L., Supp., 505, 646. See dictmn of Story, J., in LeRoy
v. Crowningshield, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8269, 362, 363 (1820): a nation "is not obliged
to depart from its own notions of judicial order from mere comity to a foreign nation.
As a rule, Statutes of Limitations are to be considered to fall within those remarks."
-16. LeRoy v. Crowningshield, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8269, 362 (1820) ; Western Lunatic
Asylum v. filler, 29 W.Va. 326, 1 S.E. 740 (1887). See Campbell v. Holt, 115
U. S. 620, 626 (1885) ; WooD, op. cit. supra note 7, at 32.
17. It was directly held that the Soviet government could not sue in this country
while it was unrecognized by the United States. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet
Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259 (1923).
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INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN UNLAWFUL POLICE INTERFERENCE
WITH UNIONIZATION*
LABOR'S attempts to organize have often been thwarted by wholesale
arrests under conveniently vague statutes or ordinances.1 While labor has
found it difficult to offer effective legal resistance to this practice, a recent
Texas decision indicates a possible solution whenever it is clear that arrests
are made maliciously and unjustifiably. Plaintiffs, members of various trade
unions, alleged that Houston police disrupted their organizational activities
by continually invading union headquarters and arresting members without
warrants on charges of vagrancy. The unions further claimed that not only
were those arrested always later acquitted, but that the police had been aware
of the groundless character of the charges and had threatened to continue
harassing the members by such methods until they left town. On the basis
of these allegations, plaintiffs petitioned for an injunction to restrain the
police officers from unlawfully arresting or molesting the members in their
legitimate union and personal activities. A general demurrer to the petition,
sustained in the trial court, was overruled on appeal on the ground that the
right to earn a living is a property right which equity will protect from un-
lawful interference by police, even though this protection incidentally involves
enjoining the prosecution of criminal proceedings. 2
It is usually said that equity will not restrain law enforcement officials
from initiating criminal prosecutions against defendants for activities which
are alleged to be legal.3 But courts have freely made exceptions to this
general rule. Injunctions- have been issued where criminal proceedings were
based upon unconstitutional legislation,4 where it was evident that officials
had seriously abused their discretion or misused their authority,5 or where
*Gurtov v. Williams, 105 S. W. (2d) 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
1. Police technique varies from region to region. Vagrancy, breach of peace, and
disorderly persons regulations are frequently used. Ex parte Cutler, 1 Cal. App. (2d)
273, 36 P. (2d) 441 (1934) ; New Orleans v. Postek, 180 La. 1048, 158 So. 553 (1934)
see Union Activity of Tenant Farmers Suppressed, 3 I. J. A. BULL. 6 (Feb., 1935);
New Jersey Disordery Persons Act, (1936) 5 I. J. A. BULL. 2.
2. Gurtov v. Williams, 105 S. W. (2d) 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), writ of error
refused by Texas Supreme Court, (1937) 6 I. J. A. BULL, 6.
3. The leading case is In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200 (1888). The cases and notes
on this point have been collected. See Comment (1935) 13 NE. L. BULL. 406.
4. Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223 (1904); Chaires v. City of Atlanta,
164 Ga. 755, 139 S. E. 559 (1927). See Fleischman, Injunctions Restraining Prosecn-
tdons Under Unconstitutional Statutes (1923) 9 A. B. A. J. 169; Notes (1926) 12 CORN.
L. Q. 87, (1933) 27 ILL. L. REv. 560.
5. American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94 (1902)
(unauthorized action by postmaster); Ashcraft v. Healey, 23 F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A.
5th, 1927) (unlawful seizure of machines by police); Ruty v. Huelsenbeck, 109 N. J.
Eq. 273, 156 Atl. 922 (1931) (unlawful raid on marathon dance); Utility Investing
Corp. v. Stuart, 11 F. Supp. 391 (E. D. Pa. 1934), aff'd, 78 F. (2d) 279 (C. C.A.
3d, 1935) (unauthorized prosecution under admittedly constitutional act); Strutwear
Knitting Company v. Olson, 13 F. Supp. 384 (D. Minn. 1936) (Governor enjoined from
closing struck factory with state troops).
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a number of vexatious criminal proceedings were threatened.0 In most cases,
the question is not whether equity has power to stay criminal proceedings,
but whether the character of plaintiff's interest is such as to warrant pro-
tection by a court of equity -an inadequate remedy at law7 and irreparable
injury to a property right being prerequisites to equitable jurisdiction.8 But
there has been no stereotyped demarcation of this category; the concept of
property rights has been so broadly expanded that it remains but a name
for those interests which equity in fact protects.0
The decision in the instant case, though comparatively novel in labor cases,
fits well within the traditional framework. In the first place, there is abun-
dant authority in favor of treating labor's right to earn a living,10 to organize
for collective bargaining," and to exercise constitutional civil liberties 12 as
valuable property interests worthy of the protection of equity. In fact, this
protection appears to be only the logical correlative of equity's traditional
preservation of conventional property interests and the right of employers
to conduct a lawful business. 13 Secondly, it seems clear that police officers
who deliberately misapply vagrancy statutes for the purpose of denying
workers their legal rights are guilty of a serious misuse of authority. And
finally, considered from a realistic viewpoint, it is evident that the threatened
6. The cases are collected in Note (1937) 6 BRoorz, L RE,. 362.
7. Davis and Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles. 189 U. S. 207 (1903). Equity
may take jurisdiction if the legal remedy is not "as complete, practical and efficient
as that which equity could afford." See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197, 214 (1923);
Hall v. Dunn, 52 Ore. 475, 479, 97 Pac. 811, 813 (1908).
8. See In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 210 (18M); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson,
223 U. S. 605, 620 (1912).
9. In addition to enjoining interferences with real property, equity has protected
"property rights" of varied and intangible character. See Chafee. The Progress of the
Law i919-2o, Equitable Relief Against Torts (1921) 34 HARv. L. REV. 38. 407 ct seq.;
Long, Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights (1923) 33 YALE L J. 115;
Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality (1916) 29
HARv. L. REv. 640; Note (1936) 14 N.Y.U. L. Q. REv. 103; cf. Note (1937) 47 Yu.m
L. J. 128, 130.
10. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915); see International News Service v.
Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 236 (1918) ("the right to acquire property by honest
labor . . . is as much entitled to protection as the right to guard property already
acquired"); Mason, Organi..cd Labor as Par, Plaintiff in Injunction Cases (1930)
30 COL L. RE%. 466, 485 especially n. 70.
11. Texas & N. 0. R. R_ v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S. S. Clerks, 281 U. S. 548
(1930) (defendant enjoined from interfering with plaintiff's property interest in col-
lective bargaining) ; see opinion in District Court, Brotherhood of Ry. and S. S. Clerks
v. Texas & N. 0. R. R., 25 F. (2d) 873, 875 (S. D. Tex. 1928).
12. Taft v. Campbell (U. S. Dist. Ct. So. Calif. 1934), 2 I.J. A. BULLt 9 (May,
1934) (free speech); American Mercury v. Chase, 13 F. (2d) 224 (D. Mass. 1926)
(free press); American Steel & Wire Co. v. Davis, 261 Fed. 800 (N. D. Ohio 1919)
(unlawful arrests); American Civil Liberties Union v. Casey (U. S. Dist. Ct. N.J.
1937), (1937) 5 I.J. A. BuLL. 120; see generally KtrNG, I-.juncrio-s To Pr.onrcr Ctvm
RIGHtTS (1937) (memorandum published by American Civril Liberties Union).
13. Dehydro, Inc. v. Tretolite Company, 53 F. (2d) 273 (N. D. Okla. 1931) ; Ander-
son Clayton & Co. v. State, 122 Tex. 530, 62 S. NV. (2d) 107 (1933).
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injury is irreparable and the remedy at law inadequate. For the drive for
unionization of a plant or an industry requires a combination of favorable
circumstances which official lawlessness can do much to destroy. Subse-
quently brought false arrest and damage suits, though useful collaterally,
14
would, even if won, hardly achieve the same results for workers as a strong
and independent collective bargaining agent.
Several rationalizations have been advanced to support the denial of in-
junctions against police officers. A common argument has been that an
injunction to restrain criminal proceedings is tantamount to a suit against
the state without .its consent.' 5 While this may be true when officials are
acting conscientiously under a valid statute, it is well established that an
officer who exceeds his authority remains no more than a private wrong-
doer. 16 A second argument has been that the effect of an injuriction would
be to appropriate to equity the functions of a criminal court, thereby depriving
the accused of his traditional safeguards.17  This contention, however, is
somewhat fanciful when it is considered that the accused himself seeks the
aid of equity; and, if the bill is dismissed, he still has an opportunity to
defend himself in the criminal courts.'8 More persuasive is the contention
that an injunction may unduly hamper law enforcement. 10 Although injunc-
tions will restrain prosecutions only where the police do not act with prob-
able cause or in good faith,20 the threat of a contempt citation may deter
authorities from instituting criminal proceedings made proper by a change
in circumstances following the issuance of the injunction. While this con-
sideration might justify the denial of an injunction in cases where officials
are making an honest, though perchance mistaken, attempt to carry out the
14. Civil actions, promptly instituted, are not to be minimized. See WooD, COLEMAN,
AND HAYS, DON'T TREAD ON ME (1928) passim. The authors emphasize the deterrent
effect of a multitude of such cases. The delay and uncertainty of recovery, however,
make the injunction a more effective safeguard.
15. See Arbucde v. Blackburn, 113 Fed. 616, 623 (C. C. A. 6th, 1902); cf. Purity
Oats Company v. State, 125 Kan. 558, 559, 264 Pac. 740, 741 (1928).
16. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908); Tebbett v. McElroy, 56 F. (2d) 621
(W. D. Mo. 1932); see Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 619 (1912).
17. See In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 210 (1888); Economy Cleaners v. Green,
184 Atl. 225, 226 (Del. Ch. 1936).
18. The argument is really more applicable to the police officer who may be punished
by contempt instead of by a civil action.
19. Hodges v. State Revenue Commission, 183 Ga. 832, 190 S. E. 36 (1937);
Davis v. American Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 75 N. Y. 362 (1878) ;
Moore v. Owen, 58 Misc. 332, 109 N. Y. Supp. 585 (Sup. Ct. 1908); Biagini v. Shoe-
maker, 122 Wash. 204, 210 Pac. 193 (1922).
20. Injunctions will not lie where arrests are threatened or made in good faith.
Harmon v. Commissioner of Police of Boston, 274 Mass. 56, 174 N. E. 198 (1931);
Davis v. American Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 75 N. Y. 362 (1878).
This is especially true where the police have reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
law is being violated. Russo v. Miller, 221 Mo. App. 292, 3 S. W. (2d) 266 (1928);
Delaney v. Flood, 183 N. Y. 323, 76 N. E. 209 (1906): see Matthews, injunctions
Against Police Activities (1926) 29 LAw Noms 227; Comment (1937) 46 YALE L..
855, 858 et seq.
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law, its relevance would seem to be slight in the instant case where officers
deliberately interfered with legitimate activities.2 ' Furthermore, the sacrifice
of vigorous enforcement of vagrancy and similar vague and easily abused
statutes seems a doubtful loss when the alternative is to countenance the
enfringement of civil liberties.2 2
INco!E TAXATION OF RIGHTS TO PURCHASE SHARES IN
ANOTHER CORPORATION *
CONSIDERABLE confusion exists among four of the federal circuits on the
question of whether rights, issued by a corporation to its shareholders, en-
titling them to buy from it stock in another and different corporation at a
stated price below the prevailing market value, constitute a taxable property
dividend upon receipt.' In the Fourth Circuit, rights of this type are held to
be mere options which, if exercised, merge with the contract of purchase, so
that there is no realized income unless the rights, or the stock acquired through
them, are sold or exchanged.2 The Second and Seventh Circuits have declared
such rights to be a property dividend, taxable at their fair market value as of
the time when the taxpayer first receives the certificates evidencing his rights.3
Recently the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First District was confronted
with the same issue. The petitioning taxpayer received from his corporation
rights to buy stock, which it owned in another and different corporation, at a
price substantially below its market value. He exercised these rights and re-
tained the stock thus obtained. The Board of Tax Appeals ruled that no tax-
able income would be realized until the stock in question was sold.' The
21. Fox Film Corp. v. Chicago, 247 Fed. 231 (N. D. Ill. 1917); 'Mills Novelty Co.
v. Farrell, 3 F. Supp. 555 (D. Conn. 1933), aff'd, 64 F. (2d) 476 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) ;
see Judge Gaynor's famous impassioned pleas in Hale v. Burns, 44 Misc. 1, 89 N. Y.
Supp. 711 (Sup. Ct 1904), and Hertz v. McDermott, 45 Misc. 23, 90 N. Y. Supp. 803
(Sup. Ct. 1904).
22. While a declaratory judgment might unmistakably establish the legality of
complainants' conduct without hampering police activity by threat of contempt proceed-
ings, the reluctance of courts to e-xtend this procedure to criminal cases, coupled with
the delay involved in obtaining it, renders such a method of doubtful value for wide-
spread general use in these situations. See Comment (1937) 46 YALE L J. 855.
*Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Palmer, 88 F. (2d) 559 (C. C. A. 1st, 1937), cerl. granted,
57 Sup. Ct. 922 (May 17, 1937).
1. The problem proposed assumes the existence of corporate earnings or profits
accumulated after February 28, 1913, from which the distribution of corporate assets
would flow as a dividend rather than as a return of capital. 49 STAT. 1687, 26 U. S. C. A.
§ 115a (Supp. 1936) and note.
2. Helvering v. Bartlett, 71 F. (2d) 598 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934).
3. Ramapo, Inc. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 84 F. (2d) 986 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936);
Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Mayer, 86 F. (2d) 593 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
4. Bradley IV. Palmer, 32 B. T. A. 550 (1935). This case was tried as a com-
panion case to Ramapo, Inc., 32 B. T. A. 561 (1935). The petitioner in the Palmer case
was an individual, in the Ramapo case, a corporation. Dividends received by an indi-
19371
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Circuit Court reversed, holding that while the taxpayer realized no income
when he first received the rights, nevertheless, upon exercising them he ob-
tained a taxable property dividend in the form of a purchase of corporate
assets for less than their actual value.5
It is unquestioned that a distribution by one corporation of stock in another
and different corporation constitutes a dividend in property which is imme-
diately taxable realized income in the shareholder's hands.0 Likewise, it is
generally accepted that when the corporation, instead of distributing such
stock outright, issues to its shareholders valuable rights to buy it at an advan-
tageous price, those shareholders thereby gain a profit which at some point
or another is subject to tax.7 The controversy centers upon the exact time of
attachment of liability for the income tax, since there are, in all, five points
of time any one of which might conceivably be selected for this purpose: first,
when the corporation declares the rights; second, when the stockholder must
be of record on the corporate books to be entitled to the rights; third, when
the certificates evidencing the rights are first received; fourth, when the right
is either sold or exercised; and fifth, when the stock acquired through exer-
cise of the right is sold.
The value of the right at the time of declaration might be employed as the
measure of the tax provided the issue is listed on an exchange and trading
in the rights begins at the moment of declaration on a "when, as, and if
issued" basis.8 Although this trading amounts in essence to short selling, it
constitutes a means for realizing cash. 9 However, the stockholder has no
enforceable claim to ownership of the rights until the record date set by the
vidual were exempt from nbrmal tax but subject to surtaxes, whereas dividends re-
ceived by a corporate stockholder under the Act here involved were wholly exempt from
income tax. This accounts for the differences in the stipulations of facts, arising from
the same distribution, which were made by the petitioners with the Commissioner. Brief
for Petitioner on Review, p. 11, Ramapo, Inc. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 84 F. (2d) 986
(C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
5. Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Palmer, 88 F. (2d) 559 (C. C. A. 1st, 1937), ceri. grant-
ed, 57 Sup. Ct. 922 (May 17, 1937).
6. Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U. S. 347 (1918).
7. Metcalf's Estate v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 32 F. (2d) 192 (C. C. A..2d, 1929)
(no distinction between stock in another corporation and valuable right to buy it) ; Ven-
ner v. Southern Pacific Co., 279 F. 832 (1923) (rights not part of sale but dividends
as such); Ramapo, Inc. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 84 F. (2d) 986 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) ;
Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Palmer, 88 F. (2d) 559 (C. C. A. 1st, 1937); Helvering v.
Bartlett, 71 F. (2d) 598 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934); I. T. 2586, X-2. Cum. Bull. 173
(1931); G. C. M. 916, VI-1 Cum. Bull. 135 (1927); G. C. M. 926, VI-1 Cum. Bull.
133 (1927).
8. The value of the rights when actually issued is always a matter of speculation
which attracts professional operators who are willing to buy or sell against future de-
livery at the date of issue. For a discussion of the speculator's interest in announced
but as yet unissued stock rights, consult DEwiNG, CoxRoRAzzoN FiNANcE (rev. ed. 1931)
315.
9. To realize cash at this time, the taxpayer would have to put up security
to assure the delivery of the certificate at the date set. Nzv YoRK STOCK EXCHANGE
DnEcroRY AND GuiE (1935) G-97.
[Vol. 47
19371 NOTES 141
resolution.' 0 At that time, the second possible point of taxation," the posi-
tion of the stockholder entitled to the rights is comparable to the status of
stockholder of record in a corporation which has declared a cash dividend
payable at a time subsequent to the record date.'" Cash dividends are not
taxable at this stage since they are not yet completely at the disposal of the
taxpayer.' 3 But although a dividend in rights is at this stage more easily dis-
posed of than a cash dividend since rights are traded in before received while
cash dividends are not,' 4 nevertheless the rightholder cannot fully enjoy his
property until he has received the certificate evidencing his right. Without it,
he cannot sell the right unless he supplies a minimum ten point margin to
assure delivery of the certificate ;'5 he cannot exercise the right without sur-
rendering the certificate ;16 nor can he pledge it as collateral for a loan unless
the certificate is available.1 Consequently, taxation of the rights as income
before the certificates are obtained would amount to an unwarranted exten-
sion of the doctrine of constructive receipt.'8
Of the three remaining alternatives, the last is not deserving of considera-
tion, since it is inconsistent with the accepted principle that a dividend, to be
recognized for taxation, need not be in cash, but may be in the form of prop-
erty exchangeable for cash.' Moreover, failure to tax the rights, or stock
purchased through their surrender, until sold or otherwise disposed of, would
unduly delay the collection of Federal revenue, cause loss in revenue in those
10. Buchanan v. National Savings & Trust Co., 23 F. (2d) 994 (App. D. C. 1923);
Richter & Co. v. Light, 97 Conn. 364, 116 Aft. 600 (1922).
11. In an advisory opinion, based on the facts of the principal case, the Treasury
Department decided that the right became unqualifiedly subject to the taxpayer's demand
and therefore taxable on the day when he had to be of record to entitle him to it. I. T.
2586, X-2, Cum. Bull. 173 (1931).
12. The dividend in the instant case consists of neither cash nor corporate stock,
but is the right itself, property equivalent to cash. I. T. 2586, X-2 Cure. Bull. 173, 175
(1931). Dividends include all distributions of surplus assets whether in the form of
cash or property, which are taken from the body of the assets to become the property
of the shareholder. See Union-& New Haven Trust Co. v. Taintor, 85 Conn. 452, 455,
83 Atl. 697, 699 (1912). There can be no distinction in a legal sense between the dis-
tribution of property as a dividend and the distribution of the equivalent in money. See
Kimball v. Success Mining Co., 38 Utah 78, 92, 110 Pac. 872, 876 (1910).
13. Avery v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 292 U. S. 210 (1934).
14. Declared but unpaid cash dividends are property and subject of contract. Home-
stake Oil Co. v. Rigler, 39 F. 40 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930). Their fixed value, however, makes
them unsuitable for trading on an exchange. For provisions for trading in stock rights
on a "when issued" basis, see NEw YORK STOcK EXCHANGE Drancrorw Ai Gums (1935)
C-79, E-17.
15. NEW YoPM STocK EXCHANGE DmEcroRy AND Guws (1935) G-97.
16. The condition stated in a stock right is that the certificate be surrendered upon
exercise of the privilege it evidences. For a typical purchase certificate, see BEn.E_, CAsEs
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATION FnTANcE (1930) 422.
17. KNIFFEN, THE PRACTICAL VoR OF A BANK (8th ed. 1934) 193.
18. Brief of Amicus Curiae, p. 30, Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Palmer, 88 F. (2d) 559
(C. C. A. 1st, 1937) ; cf. John A. Brander, 3 B. T. A. 231, 235 (1925) ; Cecil Q. Adams,
20 B.T.A. 243, 246 (1930), aff'd, 54 F. (2d) 238 (C. C.A. 1st, 1931).
19. Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U. S. 347 (1918) ; (1934) 41 NV. VA. L. Q. 93.
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instances where rightholders allow their privilege to lapse, and force the gov-
ernment to surrender to the taxpayer the choice of when, if ever, the tax is
to attach.2
0
In the principal case, the court's decision that delivery of the certificates
representing the rights did not amount to a dividend prior to sale or exercise,
apparently overlooked the common attributes of the rights and the stock
acquired through them. Both are dealt in upon the Stock Exchange in the
same manner.21 They cannot be distinguished either as to marketability or
ease of valuation. The court sought to make a distinction, however, on the
theory that the rights could not be a dividend because their issue did not
effect any depletion in the corporate assets.22 Yet the moment the shareholder
receives his irrevocable 23 privilege of buying the stock offered, the corporate
assets are reduced by the difference between the market value of that stock
and the price at which the corporation has agreed to sell it.24
Fairness to the taxpayer requires that the rights in question should not be
taxed before they come into the taxpayer's complete control, that is, at the
moment when the certificates are first delivered to him. And over a period of
time, taxation at this point should produce greater and more certain revenue
than if the authorities wait until the sale of the rights, their exercise, or the
subsequent disposal of the stock acquired. The possibility of loss through
lapse of rights would thus be avoided. Moreover, the loss of revenue that
would seemingly accompany a rapid rise in the value of the rights after
receipt would in fact be minimized by capital gains taxes upon the profit-tak-
ing sales of the rights or the stock.25 If the value of the rights decline, the
government will have obtained the maximum tax upon the dividend, and at
the same time, any subseqluent loss suffered upon sale of the rights or the
stock would be deductible only to a limited degree against ordinary income.20
20. Cf. Bull v. United States, 296 U. S. 247, 259 (1935). An example of lost rev-
enue may be found in Helvering v. Bartlett, 71 F. (2d) 598 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934), holdiig
that no tax could be levied until either rights or the stock acquired were disposed of.
The taxpayer received valuable rights, exercised them, and retained the stock acquired
until its value had shrunk to less than the option price:
21. BERLE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATION FINANCE (1930) 421; NEw
YORK STOCK EXCHIANGE DIRECTORY AND GUIDE (1935) G-156.
22. Comn'r of Int. Rev. v. Palmer, 88 F. (2d) 559, 561 (C. C. A. 1st, 1937), cert.
granted, 57 Sup. Ct. 922 (May 17, 1937).
23. Garner and Forsythe, Stock Purchase Warrants and Rights (1931) 4 So. CALIF.
L. REv. 269, 282; Comment (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 1163. Contra: Cohn v. Cities Service
Co., (S. D. N. Y. 1930) (unreported), rez/d on jurisdictional grounds, 45 F. (2d) 687
(C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
24. (1936) 31 ILL. L. REv. 537, 540, n. 11.
25. 49 STAT. 1691, 26 U. S. C. A. No. 101a (Supp. 1936); 372 C. C. H. 1937 Fed.
Tax Serv. 11859.
26. Losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets will be allowed only to the
extent of $2,000 plus the gains from such sales or exchanges. 49 STAT. 1692, 26 U. S.
C. A. § 101d (Supp. 1936); 372 C. C. H. 1937 Fed. Tax Serv. 111 862, 867.
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* STOCKHO ER'S RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION FOR PAYMENT OF TAX DEBTS
OF DISSOLVED CORPORATION
AFTER a corporation had distributed its assets among its stocldolders and
dissolved, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined a deficiency in
its tax returns. Pursuant to Section 280 of the Revenue Act of 1926,' he
instituted summary proceedings directly against one of the stockholders,
collecting the entire amount of the deficiency from him.2 This stockholder
then filed a bill in equity in a federal district court to compel contribution
from the other distributees, but the court dismissed his complaint.3 The
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal decree
on two grounds: first, that there must be some prior determination of the
defendants' liability for the tax before the plaintiff can maintain his contri-
bution suit, and second, that the plaintiff is really attempting to impose a
tax assessment in a manner not authorized by Congress.4
The initial difficulty encountered by the plaintiff in effecting an apportion-
ment of his burden was the impossibility of joining the other stockholders in
the original proceeding for the collection of the tax. Section 280 was drafted
by Congress to promote an efficient system of tax collection,G and it has been
held that, while the government may proceed against any one of several
transferees of a defaulting transferor, the transferee singled out by the
Commissioner is not entitled to delay the proceedings by impleading the
others.6 Nor does it seem that the plaintiff would have fared better in his
independent suit if he had argued in terms of subrogation to the govern-
ment's right. One who has paid more than his pro rata share of a common
obligation will ordinarily be subrogated to the rights which the creditor for-
merly held against the other obligors.7 But this remedy might be denied
the plaintiff in the instant case on the ground that if the right to collect a
* Phillips-Jones Corporation v. Parmley, 88 F. (2d) 958 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937).
1. §280 (a) (1), Revenue Act of 1926; §311 (a) (1), Revenue Acts of 1923,
1932, 1934, and 1936; 372 C. C. H. 1937 Fed. Tax Serv. U 1531.
2. This was less than the value of the assets that he had received in the distribu-
tion. The Supreme Court upheld this assessment in Phillips v. Conm'r of Int. Rev.,
283 U. S. 589 (1931), (1931) 6 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 176.
3. Phillips-Jones Corp. v. Parinley, E. D. Pa., April 16, 1936, unreported.
4. Phillips-Jones Corp. v. Parmley, 88 F. (2d) 958 (C. C. A. 3d, March 17, 1937),
cert. granted, U. S. Sup. Ct., June 1, 1937; (1937) 50 HAnv. L REv. 1317.
5. The government was formerly limited to an action at law or a bill in equity
against the transferees in order to collect the tax debts of the individual or corporation
that had distributed all its assets. Section 280 provided a summary procedure for
achieving the same result. See Phillips v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 233 U. S. SS9, 592
(1931); 5 PAUL AND MERTENs, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION (1934) §46.03.
6. Phillips v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 283 U. S. 589, 603-604 (1931); see 5 PAUL
AND MERTEwS, FiEERAL INCOME TAXATION (1934) 315, n. 32. The devices available to
the transferee for equalizing the burden when the proceedings against him are in equity
are indicated in Hatch v. Dana, 101 U. S. 205 at 214 (1879). See also Grand Rapids
National Bank, 15 B. T. A. 1166, 1182 (1929).
7. In this situation, the paying obligor is regarded as being primarily liable for his
proportionate share of the obligation and secondarily liable for the others' shares.
5 PomERoy's EQUrTY JURISPRUDENCE (2d ed. 1918) 5183, 5189.
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tax is dependent upon an assessment or a judgment in a suit brought by
the Commissioner, as the court indicates, these prerequisites might well be
considered procedural governmental prerogatives of the type to which subro-
gation does not apply."
The only other alternative is the one which the plaintiff actually used-an
action for contribution. This remedy seems particularly well suited to the
facts of the instant case. The elements necessary for the maintenance of such
an action are a class of parties subject to a common burden or obligation and
a compulsory-or, at least, a non-officious-discharge by one of the group of
more than his proportionate share.9 This latter requirement is clearly satis-
fied in the instant case by the proceeding under Section 280; and the neces-
sary common burden is supplied by the liability which springs from the well
settled rule that creditors may pursue the assets of a dissolved corporation
into the hands of any of its stockholder distributees, 10 and by the threat of an
action based upon that liability to which all of the stockholders were equally
subject."' No determination of the defendant's liability by assessment or
judgment had been obtained by the government, but it is hard to understand
the court's requirement of such a determination. A common judgment is
seldom required in cases of contribution between joint tort-feasors 12 and is
never considered essential when liability is imposed upon stockholders by
statute13 or because of unpaid stock subscriptions. 14 The second ground for
the court's decision is even less persuasive. The right to contribution arises
from the relationship between the members of a class and is based upon the
broad doctrine that "equality is equity between persons standing in the same
situation" ;115 it is a direct right of the co-obligor who has been forced to pay
the debt and is not derived from any cause of action possessed by the cred-
8. (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1242. There is authority available, however, to the effect
that there is nothing sacred about a tax assessment as such, that it is merely the deter-
mination of the amount of the tax required of each individual, and that this determina-
tion need not be made by designated government officials but may be made by the tax
statute itself. See Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227, 240 (U. S. 1873);
King. v. United States, 99 U. S. 229, 233 (1878).
9. (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 151.
10. 16 FLErcHER, CYcLoPEDIA CORPORATIONS (1931) § 8161; HOLMES, FEDE AL TAXES
(6th ed. 1925) 309.
11. See notes 1 and 5, supra. 5 PAUL AND MERTENS, FEDERAL INcOmp TAXATION
(1934) §46.08.
12. Vandiver and Co. v. Pollak, 107 Ala. 547, 19 So. 180 (1895); Duluth Ry. Co.
v. McCarthy, 183 Minn. 414, 236 N. W. 766 (1931); Gregory, Tort Contribution Prac-
tice in; New York (1935) 20 CORN. L. Q. 269.
13. Richter v. Henningsan, 110 Cal. 530, 42 P. 1077 (1895); Wolters v. Henning-
san, 114 Cal. 433, 46 P. 277 (1896); Aspinwall v. Sacchi, 57 N. Y. 331 (1874). Cf.
Foster v. Posson, 105 Wis. 99, 81 N. W. 123 (1899).
14. Siegel v. Fish, 129 Ill. App. 319 (1906) ; Lex v. Selway Steel Corp., 203 Iowa
792, 206 N. W. 586 (1925); Putnam v. Misochi, 189 Mass. 421, 75 N. E. 956 (1905);
see Hatch v. Dana, 101 U. S. 205, 214 (1879). But cf. Murray v. Bogert, 14 Johns.
(N. Y.) 318 (1817).
15. Aspinwall v. Sacchi, 57 N. Y. 331 (1874).
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itor.16 Thus, in terms of the instant case, the plaintiff is not seeking to en-
force the government's right to assess and collect a tax but rather to enforce
a duty owed directly to him by the defendant stockholders.
THE FOREIGN INJUNCTION AS A REMEDY FOR PROTECTION OF THE
PRIVILEGE OF REMOVAL TO THE FEDERAL COURTS *
A MIssouRI beneficiary desired to enforce liability on an insurance policy
written by a company organized in Connecticut and doing business in Mis-
souri. In order to prevent the insurer from removing the action to a federal
court because of diversity of citizenship, the beneficiary assigned the claim
to a resident of Connecticut. The assignee, unable to sue in the Connecticut
courts because of a Connecticut statute forbidding suit by an assignee not the
bona fide owner of the chose in action,1 instituted suit in his own name in a
Missouri state court. When the insurer petitioned for removal under the
diversity clause, the federal district court, refusing to inquire into the motive
behind the assignment, denied the petition because both parties to the action
were Connecticut residents.2 The company then brought action in Connecti-
cut to enjoin the assignee from further prosecution of the Missouri suit, but:
was denied relief on the ground that extraterritorial effect would not be given
to the Connecticut statute and there was nothing unconscionable in the device
employed to evade the jurisdiction of the federal court.3
To prevent the manufacture of federal jurisdiction, a Congressional enact-
ment prohibits suits by an assignee in a federal court unless the assignor
could have maintained suit there in the first instance. 4 The courts have also
been astute to prevent the creation of federal jurisdiction where the assign-
ment is found colorable.6 However, the decision in the principal case illus-
16. See Camp v. Bostwick, 20 Ohio St. 337, 346-347 (1870). Contribution may be
obtained from co-obligors even though they would have a valid defense to an action
by the creditor. 5 Pom-Roy's EQUrY JuMsRauDENcE 5177, n. 47. Thus, contribution
is, in effect, pro tanto reimbursement. But cf. (1937) 50 HAnV. L Rv. 1317.
* Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Bernblum, 191 At. 542 (Conn. 1937).
1. CoNN. Gax. STAT. (1930) § 5531.
2. Bernblum v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 9 F. Supp. 34 (W. D. Mo.
1934), (1935) 35 CO. L. REv. 450.
3. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Bernblum, 191 At. 542 (Conn. 1937).
A similar fact situation and decision appear in a recent case, Columbian Nat. Life Ins.
Co. v. Cross, 9 N. E. (2d) 402 (Mass. 1937), and in an earlier decision, Carson v. Dun-
ham, 149 Mfass. 52, 20 N. E. 312 (1889).
4. 24 STAT. 552 (1887), 28 U. S. C. § 41 (1) (c) (1934). However, there are two
exceptions to this rule; namely, suits on foreign bills of exchange, and corporate paer
payable to bearer.
5. This question has arisen in the above noted exceptions and decisions have been
rendered pursuant to section 37 of the Judicial Code. 18 STAT. 470 (1875), 28 U. S. C.
§ 80; cf. Bullard v. City of Cisco, 290 U. S. 179 (1933). In like manner, federal courts
have refused jurisdiction when the complainant has fictitiously increased the ad damnum
clause to meet the $3000 requisite. LeRoy v. Hartwick, 229 Fed. 857 (E. D. Ark.
1916).
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trates the contrary treatment accorded a similar maneuver to avoid removal
on the basis of diversity of citizenship.; Because the diversity clause in the
Constitution7 is not self-executing, and consequently the right of removal is
not absolute but dependent upon statutory direction,8 the federal courts have
relied upon the absence of statutory authorization in refusing jurisdiction of
a claim assigned to avoid diversity of citizenship. As a result, the insurer's
only apparent resort was to set up the defense of collusive assignment in the
Missouri action. However, this defense would almost certainly fail, 10 since
Missouri is not among those few states which have a statutory prohibition
against suits by an assignee not the bona fide owner of the cause of action."
In this situation, the insurance company sought the possibility of a foreign
injunction suit. But the Connecticut court's refusal of this remedy seems
proper for there was no question of added inconvenience or expense to the
insurer by reason of the choice of Missouri as the forum.12 And it is usually
said -that in the interest of comity among the states, the foreign injunction is
to be employed sparingly. 3 Moreover, the insurer, in the instant case, was
not complaining of an avoidance of Connecticut jurisdiction; it was simply
objecting to its inability to remove the case to a federal court subsequent to
the assignment. Even if the injunction were granted, the Connecticut court
would be unable to compel the insurance company to submit to its jurisdic-
tion14 since the assignee, not being the bona fide owner of the chose in action
within the Connecticut statute,15 would fail in any attempted suit there. A
Connecticut suit could be brought only in the name of the Missouri assignor,
and the defendant would then be in a position to remove on the ground of
diversity of citizenship. Thus a foreign injunction would inevitably force the
beneficiary into the federal courts and by indirection deny him an escape sanc-
6. In an analogous situation, federal courts have refused jurisdiction where a foreign
administrator was appointed solely to obviate diversity of citizenship. Mecom v. Fitzim-
mons Drilling Co., 284 U. S. 183 (1931), (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 639.
7. U. S. CoNsT. Art III, § 2.
8. Congress has conditioned the right of removal in various ways. 28 U. S. C.
§ 71 et seq. (1934).
9. Oakley v. Goodnow, 118 U. S. 43 (1886); Bernblum v. Travelers' Ins. Co.,
9 F. Supp. 34 (W. D. Mo. 1934), (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 450.
10. Recent decisions indicate the unavailability of this defense in Missouri and
elsewhere. Schepman v. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Ass'n, 104 S. W. (2d)
777 (Mo. 1937); Hayday v. Harnmermill Paper Co., 176 Minn. 315, 223 N. W. 614
(1929).
11. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5531; IL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1936) c. 110,
§ 146. Two other states have statutes which, though worded differently, lend them-
selves to a similar interpretation. See MD. ANN. CoDE (Bagby, 1924) art. 8, § 1; TENN.
CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) § 8619.
12. Carson v. Dunham, 149 Mass. 52, 20 N. E. 312 (1889) (refusal of a foreign
injunction; complainants contended that the equity defendant was suing abroad by vir-
tue of a colorable assignment). For a general discussion of the scope of the foreign
injunction, see Comment (1930) 39 YALE L. 3. 719.
13. See Comment (1932) 31 MicH. L. REv. 88.
14. One purpose of the foreign injunction is to protect the jurisdiction of the court
of issuance. American Express Co. v. Fox, 135 Tenn. 489, 187 S. W. 1117 (1916).
15. See note 1, supra. Cf. Muller v. Witte, 78 Conn. 495, 62 Atl. 756 (1906).
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tioned both by a previous federal court decision10 and by absence of federal
statutory provision for removal where there has been a collusive assignment.
The insurance company might possibly have escaped the jurisdiction of
the Missouri court by another device. Immediately upon ascertaining a dis-
pute with the beneficiary, it could have gone into the federal district court in
Missouri and asked for a declaratory judgment of its liability on the policy
which would have been res judicata in any subsequent suit by the benefi-
ciary.7 However, such a request would, in all probability, have been refused.
Although availability of another remedy will not alone preclude a declaration,
the imminence of suit on the policy by the beneficiary, and the adequate oppor-
tunity for the company to present its case as a defense to that suit wherein
the parties would be in their normal position would properly defeat the
remedy. s The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act was not intended to allow
foreign corporations to anticipate an adjudication of the validity of a defense,
to prevent the real plaintiff from choosing his forum, or to provide a facile
means of defeating the jurisdiction of the state courts.10
The utility of the assignment as a device for circumventing federal juris-
diction can be destroyed, however, by either a federal statute to complement
the existing legislation which prevents creation of jurisdiction by such assign-
ments,20 or by state statutes barring suit by an assignee who is not the bona
fide owner of the chose in action.2 ' And if there is any justification for diver-
sity of citizenship as a basis for federal jurisdiction, it would seem to follow
that a device which defeats the diversity rule as easily as the collusive assign-
ment in the instant case should not be accorded its intended subversive effect.
On the other hand, the decision in the instant case may be supported on the
ground that it sanctions a device which, if widely employed, may alleviate
the chronic over-crowded condition of the dockets in the federal courts.ca
16. Bernblum v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 9 F. Supp. 34 (IV. D. Mo. 1934).
17. Washington-Detroit Theater Co. v. Moore, 249 Mich. 673, 229 N. IV. 618
(1930); BoRCHARD, Dz.ARAroaY JUDGMENTS (1934) 172.
18. BoRcHAmD, DEcI.ARAToaY JUDGMEaNTS 109-113; 'Western Casualty and Surety Co.
v. Beverforden, 17 F. Supp. 928 (NV. D. Mo. 1936); Zenie Bros. v. Miskend, 10 F. Supp.
779 (S. D. N. Y. 1935). But cf. Columbian National Life Ins. Co. v. Foulke, 89 F.
(2d) 261 (C C. A. 8th, 1937).
19. Cf. Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Manning, 16 F. Supp. 430 (NV. D. Wash.
1936); Western Casualty and Surety Co. v. Beverforden, 17 F. Supp. 923 (NV. D. Mo.
1936) ; Beatty v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 49 Vyo. 22, 52 Pac. (2d) 404 (1935) ; Boa-
cARD, DECLARAToRY JUDGMES 110, 178.
20. In contrast to their policy of regarding as immaterial the colorable nature of
an assignment made to defeat diversity jurisdiction, the federal courts have taken jn-is-
diction where parties defendant have been fraudulently joined in a tort action for the
same end. Wecker v. National Enameling and Stamping Co., 204 U. S. 176 (1907);
cf. Morris v. . I. Dupont de Nemours and Co., 68 F. (2d) 783 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
However, this latter device is more objectionable than a collusive assignment for it
subjects to litigation another party who otherwise would not have been introduced.
21. Only a very few states have such legislation at the present time; see note 11,
Pra.
22. For statistical analyses of the relationship of the number of diversity cases
occurring in the federal courts to the need for legislation abolishing this ground of
removal, see Yntema, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Controersi s Between
1937]
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But regardless whether -this result is desirable, the tactical maneuvering in the
instant case illustrates the objectionable practices encouraged by an anomalous
judicial system composed of two sets of courts rendering opposite decisions
on identical substantive issues-an anomaly created by the federal courts'
assertion of power to declare the state law independently of the decisions of
the state courts.23
RATIFICATION OF CHILD LABOR AMENDMENT BY A STATE LEGISLATURE
AFTER PREVIOUS REJECTION *
THaE Child Labor Amendment was proposed by Congress on June 2, 1924,
and by the end of 1932 had been ratified by six states and rejected by thirty-
six. The total of ratifying states has now increased to twenty-eight, twenty of
which had at one time rejected it. Spurred on by these recent legislative vic-
tories, the foes of the amendment have twice sought to block it in the courts.
Thus immediately after the Kentucky and Kansas Legislatures purported to
ratify the proposal early in 1937, several members of each legislature filed
suit for a declaration as to the validity of the ratification.1 The Court of
Appeals of Kentucky declared the resolution of ratification void, holding that
rejection of the amendment by the Kentucky legislature in 1926 precluded a
subsequent ratification by that state unless the proposal was resubmitted by
Congress.2 The court further stated that, even if Kentucky had not previous-
ly rejected the amendment, that state would have been barred from ratifying
since affirmative rejection of the amendment by more than one-fourth of the
states made subsequent adoption impossible. The court thought finally that
the amendment had been pending for too long a period to be still subject to
ratification. The Kansas Supreme Court came to an exactly contrary con-
clusion.3
The assertion in the Kentucky case that once a state has rejected an amend-
ment it can no longer ratify it rests upon questionable ground, for, although
the Supreme Court of the United States has never spoken on the subject,
constitutional commentators unanimously maintain a contrary position.4
Their argument proceeds upon the basis that the power of ratification -is one
Citizens of Different States (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 71, 149; Clark, Diversity of CitLuen-
ship Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 499.
23. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U. S. 1 (1842); Shulman and Jaegerman, Some Jurisdic-
tional Limitations on Federal Procedure (1936) 45 YjAE L. J. 393, n. 36.
*Wise et al. v. Chandler et al., Ky. Court of Appeals, Oct. 1, 1937; Coleman el al.
v. Miller et aL, 71 P. (2d) 518 (Kan. 1937).
1. In the Kentucky case an order was also sought to restrain Governor Chandler
from certifying the result to the Secretary of State of the United States.
2. Wise et al. v. Chandler et al., Ky. Court of Appeals, Oct. 1, 1937.
3. Coleman et al. v. Miller et al., 71 P. (2d) 518 (Kan. 1937).
4. E.g., JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS (4th ed. 1887) § 579; 1 WnI-
LOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1910) 521; Dodd, Amending
the Constitution (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 321, 347; Orfield, Procedure of Federal Amending
Power (1930) 25 ILL. L. REV. 418, 439.
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derived from the federal constitution and is a power to ratify, not a power
to reject.5 Rejection is thus a negative step which is equivalent to complete
inaction, and the power to ratify continues until it is affirmatively exercised.0
While such subtle constitutional interpretation is by no means conclusive, the
argument gains support from practice, for states which had rejected the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments but had subsequently re-
versed their position were included in the list of ratifying states and consti-
tuted a part of the requisite three-fourths majority.7 The doctrine that a
uniform and long continued interpretation of a question by the executive and
legislative departments will not be overthrown by the judiciary unless the
construction is dearly contrary to the Constitution8 may thus be invoked.
And if it is conceded that a previous rejection does not operate to deprive a
state of the power of ratification, it is difficult to see how the rejection by
thirteen states, possessed of similar power to ratify subsequently, can so
operate.0
There is somewhat more substance to the Kentucky court's holding that
the ratification was void because more than a reasonable time has elapsed
since the submission of the amendment by Congress. In deciding in Dillon v.
Gloss'0 that Congress had power to insert a clause in the Eighteenth Amend-
ment limiting the period of ratification to seven years and that such a restric-
tion was reasonable, the Supreme Court indicated that the length of the rati-
fication process must be restricted even in the absence of limitation clauses.
The court merely held, however, that seven years was a reasonable time; it
did not hold that seven years was the only reasonable time or that more than
seven years constituted an ,,nreasonabIc time.' And any general language
employed by the court must be viewed in the light of the amendments which
at that time remained unratified. There were four of these, two of which
5. Dodd, Amending the Constitution (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 321, 347. The same
rules of construction should undoubtedly apply to the case of ratification by conventions
as to that of ratification by state legislatures.
6.. When the power of ratification is exercised, the commentators say that the
act is irrevocable. Dodd, supra note 4, at 346, 340.
7. In the case of the Fifteenth Amendment the states involved were Ohio and
New Jersey. The former was included in the list of ratifying states and constituted
part of the majority necessary for adoption. Aams, PnoposEn A-MrzDt mTS TO THE
CoNsTTrro (1897) (Ann. Rep. Am. Hist. Ass'n, 1896, vol. 2) 300. In the cases
of the other amendments there were complicating factors which detract from the force
of the argument. See Brief for Appellants, pp. 22-28, Wise ct al. v. Chandler et al.,
Ky. Court of Appeals, Oct. 1, 1937.
8. The Laura, 114 U. S. 411 (1885) ; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 (1901);
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
9. The ,Vadsworth-Garrett Joint Resolution [Sen. J. R. No. 8; House J. R.
No. 15, 69th Cong. Ist Sess. (1926)] proposed an amendment to read as follows:
"Provided . . . that until three fourths of the states have ratified or more than one
fourth of the states have rejected or defeated a proposed amendment, any state may
change its vote." This proposal died in committee.
10. 256 U. S. 368 (1921).
11. Exclusive of the "Bill of Rights" the longest period required for the ratifica-
tion of an amendment has been three years and six months, the shortest has been
nine months, and the average time required has been one year and six months.
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were submitted in 1789,12 one in 1810, and one in 1861; the Child Labor
Amendment had not yet been proposed. Equally unconvincing is the con-
tention advanced by the Kentucky court that the action of Congress in attach-
ing a seven year limitation to several amendments indicated the opinion of that
body that seven years was the maximum reasonable time. Since Congress
used the limitation in the Eighteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first Amend-
ments but not in the Nineteenth and Child Labor Amendments, a more co-
gent argument could be made, that in the latter cases it had no predilections
on the matter at all. The dictum in Dillon v. Gloss that any alteration in
the Constitution should be made while the sentiment for the amendment could
be fairly supposed to exist 3 furnishes no conclusive guide to the instant situa-
tion. The friends of the proposed amendment point to the recent revival of
interest in the problem; its enemies point to the period of complete inaction
between 1927 and 193314 and maintain that the interest and sentiment must
be continuing--that a renaissance is of no avail.15
The recent controversy over the Supreme Court would probably make
that tribunal extremely reluctant to declare the ratifications in the principal
cases invalid. It is probable, however, that the court will avoid embarrassment,
for precedent enables it to declare that the petitioners have no standing to
challenge the validity of the resolutions.1" While the Supreme Court has
determined the validity of already adopted amendments in cases where the
legality of acts already committed by the parties depended upon that deter-
mination,' 7 the court has refused to enjoin the Secretary of State from pro-
12. After the "salary grab" act of 1873, Ohio ratified one of these proposals,
which deal with the compensation of members of Congress. The validity of the action
was not litigated. JAMEsoN, CONSTITrTIONA CONVENTIONS (4th ed. 1887) § 586.
13. 256 U. S. 374. This view was originally espoused by JAMESON, CoNsTITu-
TIoNAL CONVENTIONS (4th ed. 1887) § 585.
14. During these years only one state, Colorado, took any action at all on the
proposed amendment.
15. See Report of Special Committee of the American Bar Association (1935)
21 A. B. A. J. 11.16. Tyker v. Judges, 179 U. S. 405 (1900) ; Williams v. Riley, 280 U.S. 78 (1929);
Ex parte Albert Levitt, 5 U. S. L. W. 119 (1937); see BORCHARD, DEcLARATORy JuDG-
mENTS (1934) 26-62; Comment (1927) 41 HARv. L. REV. 232.
The majority of state courts recognize any citizen's interest, however trifling,
as sufficient, especially when the issue is important publicly. Ellingham v. Dye, 178
Ind. 336, 99 N.E. 1 (1912); Zoercher v. Alger, 202 Ind. 214, 172 N.E. 186 (1930).
See authorities cited in (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 340, 341.
In the Kentucky case any objection to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's interest was
waived by failure to demur specially to the petition. Board of Park Comm'rs v. Speed,
215 Ky. 319, 285 S. W. 212 (1926). And in Kentucky the court may disregard the
question of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's interest in suit "where the importance of
the controversy to the State requires a decision upon the merits". Miller v. Johnson,
92 Ky. 589, 18 S. W. 522 (1892).
In the Kansas case the court held that since the State had been made a party to the
proceedings, the right of the parties to maintain the action was beyond question. State
v. Public Service Comm., 135 Kan. 491, 11 P. (2d) 999 (1932).
17. National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350 (1920); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U. S.
130 (1922); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U. S. 368 (1921); United States v. Sprague, 282
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claiming the adoption of an amendment on the ground that the plaintiff lacked
sufficient interest to give him standing in court1 8 And in a suit to enjoin a
governor of a state from submitting a proposed amendment to a state leg-
islature,19 a lower federal court denied relief on the ground that the plaintiff
failed to show even impending injury since there was no assurance that the
amendment would ever be adopted-reasoning which could be applied to the
present situation with telling effect. If the court refuses to entertain a suit
before adoption, any attempt to attack an adoped amendment on the ground
that some of the resolutions pf ratification were inoperative would seem to be
precluded by the statement in Leser v. GarncttP° that duly authenticated notice
is conclusive on the Secretary of State, and when certified to by his proclama-
tion, is conclusive on the courts. 2 ' The desirability of refusing to allow an
attack on an amendment before its adoption depends ultimately on whether
it is thought, on the one hand, that the procedural difficulties in framing con-
stitutional questions should be minimized in the interests of efficiency and
certainty,22 or, on the other, that constitutional decisions should be few in
number, postponed as long as possible, and rendered only if they can not be
avoided.23
U. S. 716 (1931). These cases overruled a dictum in Luther v. Borden, 7 Ho-. I
(U. S. 1849) that the issue of the validity of an amendment was political.
18. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S. 126 (1922).
19. State of Ohio v. Cox, 257 Fed. 334 (S. D. Ohio 1919).
20. 258 U. S. 130 (1922); cf. United States v. Colby, 265 Fed. 998 (App. D. C.
1920), writ of error dismissed, 257 U. S. 619 (once Secretary of State has performed
ministerial duty of proclaiming adoption of amendment no basis for relief remains).
21. The petitioners in the Kentucky case cited this statement as the reason for
their attempt to enjoin the governor before he could send in the notice of ratification.
The restraining order was issued, but summons was not served until after the notice
was in the mails. Brief for Appellants, pp. 2, 13, Wise ct al. v. Chandler et at.,
Ky. Court of Appeals, Oct. 1, 1937. The court held that this circumstance did not
deprive the court of the jurisdiction already attached. McHugh v. Louisville Bridge
Co., 23 Ky. Law Rep. 1546, 65 S. NV. 456 (1901); Saint Lawrence and S. F. R. R.
v. Cross, 171 Fed. 480 (1909).
22 Fraenkel, Constitutional Issues in the Supreme Court (1936) 85 U. or PA.
L. REv. 27, 78; Comment (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1195.
23. Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions (1924) 37 HAnv. L Rzv. 1002;
Comment (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 649, 670; Comment (1936) 46 YA=.n L. J. 253, 268
et seq.
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